

## IN THE CLAIMS

1. (Currently Amended) Method A method for securing updating data from a plurality of apparatuses, each apparatus receiving the updates from a managing center, ~~[[these]]~~ the updates including data-called patch data accompanied by a control block encrypted by a private asymmetrical key taken from a list of keys included in the managing center, ~~characterized by following the method~~ comprising the steps of:

~~[[ -]] selection~~ selecting by means of the apparatus of a current key from a list of public keys stored in a non-volatile memory of the apparatus~~[[.]];~~

~~[[ -]] reception~~ receiving and storage storing in the memory of the updating patch the patch in a random access memory~~[[.]];~~

~~[[ -]] reception~~ receiving the encrypted control block~~[[.]];~~

~~[[ -]] decryption of said block by the~~ decrypting the encrypted control block using the selected current public key~~[[.]];~~

~~[[ -]] verification~~ verifying that the decrypted control block corresponds to said patch data~~[[.]];~~

~~[[ -]] installation of~~ installing the patch received data~~[[.]];~~ and

~~[[ -]] deactivation of~~ deactivating the current public key and ~~selection of the next key in the list~~ such that a different public key is used to decrypt a next control block.

2. (Currently Amended) Method The method according to Claim 1, wherein the control block includes a signature on the patch data, ~~[[this]]~~ the signature being ~~[[the]]~~ a result of a hash function.

3. (Currently Amended) Method The method according to Claims 1 and 2, wherein the ~~verification of the block~~ verifying step includes the step of establishing the signature on the received patch and the comparison with the decrypted signature in the control block.

4. (Currently Amended) ~~Method~~ The method according to Claim 1, wherein the control block includes a symmetrical session key ~~determined by the managing center, [[this]]~~ the symmetrical session key being used to encrypt the patch data.

5. (Currently Amended) ~~Method~~ The method according to Claim 1, wherein, for each ~~update~~ encrypted control block, a new public key taken from the list is used by the apparatus.

6. (Currently Amended) ~~Method~~ The method according to Claim 1, wherein the public key is deleted from the list after being used, said key being useless for the next updates.

7. (Currently Amended) ~~Method~~ The method according to Claim 1, wherein the public keys of the list are used sequentially in a predetermined order during each update.

8. (Currently Amended) ~~Method~~ The method according to Claim 1, wherein the list of public keys is stored in a non-volatile memory, and wherein a key used for an update is definitively deleted from the memory that authorizes the access to the next key for the subsequent update.

9. (Currently Amended) ~~Method~~ The method according to Claim 1, wherein, for the updating of the software of an apparatus of ~~a certain version~~ an old version to a new version, with a difference between the new version and the ~~previous one~~ old version being greater than one, at least one message encrypted with a private key is added allowing the changing of the current key to the next key in the list, the successful decryption of said message inducing the deactivation of the current key and the selection of the next key.

10. (Currently Amended) ~~Method~~ The method according to Claim 9, wherein the number of messages corresponds to the number of updates separating the initial version of the apparatus and the final version of the update.

11. (Currently Amended) ~~Method~~ The method according to Claim 1, wherein an updating installation is followed by an increment on a counter or by moving a pointer indicating the position of

the key to be selected from the list during the subsequent update, while the list of keys remains unchanged.

12. (Currently Amended) ~~Method~~ The method according to Claim 1, wherein the control block is successively encrypted by the keys of the previous updates, each key from the list being used one after the other to decrypt the signature.

13. (Currently Amended) ~~Method~~ The method according to Claim 1, wherein the apparatuses consist of Pay-TV decoders, an update of a decoder being carried out by downloading, from a managing center, of a patch accompanied by a control block, said block is stored in a Random Access Memory, and is decrypted with a current public key contained in a first non-volatile memory of the decoder, then verified and in the case of correspondence, a command leads the installation of the patch in a second non-volatile memory and the deactivation of the current key.

14. (Currently Amended) ~~Method~~ The method according to Claim 13, wherein a new list of public keys is transmitted to the decoder, said list replaces the list contained in the first memory containing keys deactivated by previous successful updates.

15. (New) A system for securing software updates including patch data, the system comprising:

a processor; and

a non-volatile memory connected to the processor for storing a list of public keys;

wherein the processor is configured to perform the steps of

receiving the patch data;

receiving an encrypted control block associated with the patch data, the encrypted control block being encrypted with an asymmetrical private key selected from a list of keys in a management center;

selecting a public key from the list of public keys stored in the non-volatile memory;  
decrypting the encrypted control block using the key selected in the previous step;  
verifying that the control block corresponds to the patch data;  
installing the patch data if the encrypted control block corresponds to the patch data; and  
deactivating the public key used in the decrypting step such that a new public key from  
the list of public keys stored in the non-volatile memory.

16. (New) The system of claim 15, wherein the memory is an electrically erasable programmable read only memory (EEPROM).

17. (New) The system of claim 15, wherein the control block includes a signature on the patch data, the signature being a result of a hash function.

18. (New) The system of claim 15, wherein the control block includes a symmetrical session key determined by the managing center, the symmetrical session key being used to encrypt the patch data.